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RANDALL HARLOW 
Abstract: This article presents an ecological model of musical performance drawn from 
the field of Gibsonian Ecological Psychology and the techniques of Actor-Network Theory 
as explicated by Bruno Latour and others. Citing a wide body of empirical research, it 
is argued that musicians and their musical instruments exist in an ecological relationship 
at the level of embodied gesture. Furthermore, it is proposed that every act of musicking 
amounts to a construction of a network of actors that define an “Ecology of Practice,” a thick 
description more fully encompassing the complexities of musicking than traditional notions 
of performance practice. 
Résumé : Cet article présente un modèle écologique de l’interprétation musicale inspiré du 
champ de la psychologie écologique gibsonienne et des techniques de la théorie de l’acteur-
réseau telle que définie par Bruno Latour et d’autres. Sur la base d’un large corpus de recherche 
empirique, il avance que les musiciens et leurs instruments existent dans une relation écologique 
au niveau du geste incarné. En outre, il propose que chaque acte consistant à jouer de la 
musique corresponde à la construction d’un réseau d’acteurs qui définissent une « écologie de la 
pratique », description dense qui englobe plus pleinement les complexités du fait de jouer de la 
musique que les notions de pratiques performancielles.
“He sits on the bench, engages the pedals, and pulls out the stops, 
he sizes up the instrument with his body, he incorporates its 
directions and dimensions, and he settles into the organ as one 
settles into a house.” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012 [1945]: 146)
Writing in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s description of the psychological state of an organist familiarizing himself with a new and 



















































breaking down the dualisms of subject and object, perception and cognition 
holds striking similarities to that of his American contemporary, psychologist 
James J. Gibson but also as an early foray into the study of the psychological 
complexities of musical perception and performance (Sanders 1993: 289). 
Merleau-Ponty describes the organist settling into an environment, a habitat, 
for whom the gestures of interaction are ingrained gestalts, wherein a “direct 
relationship” is established between the organist’s body and the organ (Merleau-
Ponty 2012 [1945]: 147). The parallels with Gibson’s work are undeniable, a 
musical analogue to Gibson’s concept of “direct perception” by an organism 
of the affordances of an environment forged through cycles of perception 
and action (Gibson 2002 [1972]: 77). Following Merleau-Ponty’s early 
insight, engagement with “musicking”1 as a Gibsonian ecological situation 
has recently begun to be explored more thoroughly, including the semiotic 
dimensions of ecological listening (Clarke 2005), the confluence of ecological 
listening and ecological psychology in the construction of the opposition of 
music and noise (Windsor 2016), and the constraints of musical instruments 
on the act of performance (Windsor and de Bezenac 2012).
The rich and complex act of musicking has been and continues to be 
examined from several perspectives: from the cultural factors shaping, and 
shaped by, the practice of performance, to the social dimensions of the musical 
situation; from the politics and economics of a cultural practice, to the empirical 
psychological or cognitive picture of the performer in action. Among these 
diverse approaches, performance is often, even if inadvertently, presented in a 
sort of Cartesian Dualism: the cultural and social dimensions of “performance 
practice” seem to be independent from the embodied cognition and action of 
the individual performer. For example, many culture-centred approaches offer 
a top-down perspective, evaluating a performance tradition as a whole. Such 
approaches may offer a picture of what an individual musical situation may have 
been like by contextualizing new primary source material within the context 
of stabilized social collectives. On the other hand, many cognition-centred 
approaches tend to offer a bottom-up perspective, gathering empirical evidence 
from individual musical acts to build a broad and predictive model of the human 
mind during performance, a model from which the social collective is more 
or less an emergent property. This is not to say that scholars have not sought 
to cross this divide. Indeed, practices in ethnomusicology and, more recently, 
performance studies2 connect the social and cognitive in compelling ways, 
examples of which will be discussed below. As such, this paper does not seek to 
solve a specific problem or argue that a social-cognitive divide is prevalent across 
all areas of music studies. Rather, it attempts to present a new, more systematic, 
and comprehensive framework with which to connect the two. 
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The gulf that can sometimes be found between social and cognitive studies 
of musicking is analogous to what Philippe Descola calls the “anthropological 
dualism” of cultural vs. nature-centred approaches in his field (2013: 27). 
Social and cognitive approaches to performance studies may each be left alone, 
their respective epistemologies borne of conflicting ontologies — as Descola 
says about anthropology, “Each one ends up at a point from which the other 
believes to be departing” (54). However, one can reconcile these approaches 
by stepping back from this dualism to find new ways with which to allow 
these perspectives to inform and shape one another (54). This paper presents 
a Gibsonian ecological3 model that draws upon empirical research and the 
techniques of actor-network theory as explicated by Bruno Latour. I present 
musical performance as a network of “actors” constructed ecologically by an 
individual through gesture. In this view, individuals construct and embody what 
I call “ecologies of practice.” Though this paper primarily takes the viewpoint of 
a performer in action, this theory is generalizable to any individual situated in 
the act of musicking, including performers, composers, listeners, or participants 
of all kinds and across all cultures.
Performance as Ecology
Over the span of a quarter century, Gibson presented a new model of perception 
which rejected a linear computational and abstract symbol-processing model of 
the mind (Goldstein 1981: 191). Rather, Gibson postulated that organisms 
directly perceive what he calls the “affordances” for agency in their environment 
(Gibson 1979: 18). As mentioned above, Gibson’s perspective was symbiotic 
with Merleau-Ponty’s contemporaneous deconstruction of the dichotomies 
of subject and object, organism and environment, perception and action. 
From the moment of birth, an organism moves, reaches, and grasps. Every 
action precipitates new perceptual stimuli, which in turn shape decisions for 
future actions and construct the organism’s environment as an assemblage of 
affordances. That is, an organism’s environment, as defined from an ecological 
perspective, is a reality specific to the individual organism as perceived through 
the lens of affordances assembled from the individual’s unique experiences.
In considering an ecological model of performance analogous to Gibson’s 
ecological model of perception, consider the musical counterparts to the three 
pillars of Gibsonian Ecology: perception and action, perceptual learning, and 
adaptation. A performing musician can be said to enact cycles of perception 
and action much like an organism in its environment. The relationship between 
perception and action can be represented by a continuous feedback loop (Fig. 
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Fig 1. Perception and Action, Perceptual Learning, and Adaptation in a Gibsonian ecological model of 
musical performance.
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1). Consider a performer playing a familiar piece of music. She sees the music 
on the page and immediately conjures up an aural sound concept, an “auditory 
image” (Highben, Zebulon, and Palmer 2004: 64). She knows what this 
passage sounds like, the result of an unmediated cognitive realization of the 
notes on the page, the accuracy of which is a function of musical skill and level 
of experience with the given piece. As she is seeing and “hearing” the music 
on the page, she musters up her carefully honed technique and operates the 
mechanics of the instrument using kinesthetic action to generate the desired 
sounds. As the music emerges from the instrument, it is immediately fed 
back into the performer aurally and haptically. This feedback influences both 
decisions relating to the past, “Is this the sound I intended to make?” and future, 
“How should I play the following passage given what I just heard?” or “Should 
I change what I had originally intended to do as a result?” This stage might 
simply be described as music cognition, the ecological dynamics of which will 
be thoroughly considered below. Despite the visual mapping in Fig. 1, this so-
called “psychohaptic” feedback loop is not a linear process with stages moving 
in one direction or another. Rather, it is constantly moving in all directions at 
once at many conscious and unconscious levels. 
The process of perceptual learning is evident in the development of the 
performer from beginner to expert. It is borne out through countless cycles 
of perception and action during practice, lessons, and formal performance. 
Returning to our hypothetical performer, from the first moment she picked 
up her instrument she has honed her abilities at kinesthetic action, sharpened 
her aural perception, and developed an increasingly sophisticated cognition of 
music. Through cycles of perception and action, perceptual learning achieves an 
increased “resonance” to the affordances of the instrument and music at hand; 
a symbiotic relationship develops between aural perception, kinesthetic action, 
and cognition. To quote Gibson, “the orienting of the organs of perception is 
governed by the brain so that the whole system of input and output resonates 
to the external information” (1966: 5).
The last pillar of Gibsonian Ecology, adaptation, can be traced through 
the evolution of musical instrument design, schools of performance techniques 
and pedagogy, and shifting cultural musical aesthetics in the time and place of 
the performer. How these factors evolve and interact of course encompasses 
whole fields of study. However, the fact of their interaction, and the specific 
ways in which they shape perception, action, and perceptual learning is central 
to the thesis of this paper and will be elaborated upon below. 
Gibson’s theories garnered skepticism early on regarding their 
epistemological veracity. However, as theoretical and neurological cognitive 
science has advanced over the past quarter century, Gibsonian ecological 
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psychology has been found to be remarkably symbiotic with empirical research. 
On the other hand, regardless of whether Gibson’s model of perception is 
physiologically supported, it has been argued that Gibsonian ecology can serve 
as a powerful tool for discourse on metaphysics and epistemology (Sanders 
1993: 293). One can thus argue for an ecological model of music performance 
on its own merits as a means to untangle the intersecting and often conflicting 
ontologies of music discourse. 
Empirical support for Gibsonian ecology can be found in the back-
propagating, connectionist model of the brain and its applications in machine 
learning software. This model is remarkably isomorphic with the Gibsonian idea 
of “direct perception” and the process of perceptual learning through feedback 
cycles of perception and action. Other evidence for the empirical veracity 
of Gibsonian ecology can be found in common coding theory in cognitive 
neuroscience, a model that is also highly sympathetic to Gibson’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s approaches. Furthermore, current theories of a mind centred on 
embodied cognition are consistent with Gibson’s principle of direct perception.
In the connectionist model of the brain, the process of back-propagation 
accounts for learning in both perception and action through the construction 
of neural networks stabilized through repeated reinforcement (Churchland 
1995). First introduced by Werbos (1975) in the period between two important 
works by Gibson (2002 [1972] and 1977), the back-propagation model offers a 
physiological grounding for Gibson’s theories of direct perception and perceptual 
learning, eschewing intermediary representations in the cognitive process. More 
recently, this model has been applied toward so-called “deep learning” as a 
means for software to network connections within data sets through recursive 
refinement, compelling novel solutions from such connections without 
intermediary logics (LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton 2015).
Turning to common coding theory, numerous studies support Gibson’s 
model of perceptual learning formed through cycles of perception and action 
and the ecological model of performance presented here. Common coding 
postulates that action perception, action imagery, and kinesthetic action share 
a common cognitive domain (van der Wel, Sebanz, and Knoblich 2012: 
102). Studies supporting this hypothesis show, for example, that observers 
are better able to predict the outcome of kinesthetic action when observing 
their own past actions vs. those of others (Knoblich and Flach 2001: 471), or 
when observing actions in which they have considerable first-hand expertise 
vs. those where experience is primarily observational (Aglioti et al. 2008). 
One brain study showed that dancers exhibited similar brain activation when 
observing dance patterns for which they had trained physically or visually, but 
different activation when observing patterns for which they had not trained 
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at all and thus had no prior gestural perceptual learning (Cross et al. 2009). 
Additionally, the discovery of so-called “mirror neurons” has offered a possible 
physiological explanation for these results. Such neurons fire during both action 
and perception, suggesting that the common coding of perception and action 
may be hardwired in the brain. However, the specific theoretical implications of 
mirror neurons, and indeed their existence in humans, remains hotly debated 
(Kilner and Lemon 2013).
Connecting common coding to the music field, Bruno Repp and Günther 
Knoblich postulate an “action-identity hypothesis” linking auditory perception 
and kinesthetic action. They present a study in which pianists were able to 
recognize their own performances months later and could identify recordings 
altered to leave only nuance in timing (Repp and Knoblich 2004: 607). In a 
later study, Repp and Knoblich show that higher levels of performance expertise 
can shape pitch perception accuracy, both positively and negatively, depending 
on the mapping of perception with the action of procedural memory (Repp 
and Knoblich 2007: 7). In sum, empirical evidence seems to support Gibson’s 
model based on perceptual learning through cycles of perception and action.
Other similarities to Gibson’s theories can be found in embodied 
cognitive theories of mind. Conceptual metaphor theory, as developed by 
Mark Turner, George Lakoff, and Mark Johnson, among others, argues that 
much of human communication and signification is constructed through 
mappings of concepts across domains. The foundations of such mappings 
trace back to our embodied experience of the world, structured through pre-
conceptual image schemas. The concept of image schemas is roughly analogous 
to Gibson’s catalog of so-called “invariants” in the environment that govern 
new mappings in direct perception. As humans encounter new signifiers, they 
are interpreted through similarities in the underlying image schemas, much as 
an organism identifies invariants in stimuli during novel perceptual situations 
to construct a meaningful environment. Applications of conceptual metaphor 
theory to music can be found most notably in the work of Lawrence Zbikowski. 
Utilizing the principles of cross-domain mapping, Zbikowski demonstrates 
how we construct, through established signifiers, new musical hermeneutics 
grounded in the invariants of abstract, generic conceptual space (Zbikowski 
2005). Music theorist Steve Larson identifies three metaphorical forces central 
to the syntax and semantics of common Western music: magnetism, gravity, 
and inertia (Larson 1997-98). Each provides a tool for mapping musical 
sound to kinesthetic experience, providing an embodied cognitive foundation 
for a large part of the musical hermeneutic process. Additionally, scholars 
in evolutionary psychology postulate that music itself may have evolved not 
for mating, but specifically as a means for embodied cross-domain mapping, 
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increasing the human mind’s capacity for abstract thought and paving the way 
for the development of language (Cross 2005: 37). 
Gesture in the Ecology of Performance
It may be all well and good to claim that one can map the act of musical 
performance onto a Gibsonian ecological model, but how exactly do these 
pieces connect? How does embodied music cognition founded on conceptual 
metaphor connect with aural perception, and how exactly are they both shaped 
by and shaping the kinesthetic act of performance? Furthermore, precisely 
how do pedagogical schools, culturally-defined performance practices, and 
musical instrument design influence all three parts of the perception and action 
psychohaptic feedback loop? In other words, where does the “rubber meet the 
road”? I argue that the element uniting all these diverse processes is gesture. I 
refer to gesture in a literal sense — as kinesthetic action, i.e., patterns of tension 
and release in the human musculature system — but also in the metaphorical 
sense, defined generically by Robert Hatten as an indivisible “energetic shaping 
through time” (2004: 287).
In practice, it can be difficult to pin down exactly where a gesture begins 
and ends in both physical and metaphorical domains. Hatten’s general definition 
of gesture provides a cogent basis from which to reason about gesture’s role in all 
domains of perception, action, and cognition. Most of the studies cited above 
can be seen as pertaining to gesture. For instance, effects of common coding 
theory are primarily observed in a gestural context, illustrating physiological 
and behavioural connections between the “energetic shaping through time” of 
action perception, action imagery, and kinesthetic action. Embodied metaphor 
theory and Larson’s musical forces offer the means by which gesture is mapped 
from the physical to the aural and up the semiotic ladder. 
Empirical support for the primacy of gesture in action, perception, and 
perceptual learning in music is vast. In examining spontaneous hand gestures, 
Rolf Godøy provides insight into what he calls “motormimetic cognition”: 
the idea that motor imagery and perceived or imagined musical sound run in 
parallel (2009: 205). Godøy argues that hand gestures have a “privileged role 
in motormimetic cognition of musical sound,” in that they “trace the geometry 
(i.e. elements such as pitch contour, pitch spread, rhythmic patterns, textures, 
timbral features), as well as convey sensations of effort of musical sound” (205; 
emphasis in original). Following the latter point, Jan Schacher and Angela 
Stoecklin demonstrate that inertia, rather than absolute spatial position, is the 
central carrier of emotion in dance gestures (2011). Additionally, Marc Leman 
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and Luiz Naveda examine the ways in which musical cues embody dance 
gestures (2010). 
There is also a body of research connecting physical gesture with 
musical expression. Sofia Dahl and Anders Friberg studied how subjects rate 
the emotional intentions of performers based on full and partial views of 
their performances. Specific gestural geometries from one performer to the 
next differed greatly, being unique to the physicality of their instruments, but 
invariants in the physical gestures of each were perceived as associated with 
sadness, happiness, and anger (Dahl and Friberg 2007). Bruno Repp sought to 
define the constraints of expressive timing in a study that asked listeners to rate 
the expressive timing of one specific gesture in Robert Schumann’s “Träumerei.” 
The most experienced listeners rated parabolic temporal shapes the highest 
(Repp 1992). This suggests certain optimal energetic shapings through time 
within specific cultural musical practices. 
Evidence suggests that there is a very deep connection between the 
gestures of performance and the perception of musical meaning. I have 
demonstrated how in organ performance specific Baroque fingering patterns 
and figures generate unexpected variations in note lengths, and hence construct 
idiomatic musical gestures (Harlow 2013). Similarly, Joel Speerstra argues, 
with regards to Baroque keyboard figures and clavichord technique, that for a 
meaningful understanding of baroque keyboard aesthetics one cannot separate 
the rhetorical figure from the subtleties (the energetic shaping through time) 
of the physical gesture at the keyboard, and one cannot separate the physical 
gesture at the keyboard from the resulting musical rhetoric (2004). Music 
teachers regularly utilize the cross-domain fluidity of gesture. They exert a great 
deal of energy coaxing students to execute a musical passage with precisely the 
right kinesthetic action (i.e. physical gesture) toward specific musical ends. 
Pedagogues often unconsciously utilize arm gestures, body gestures, and vocal 
gestures to influence the kinesthetic actions of the pupil at the instrument. 
It follows that musical gesture and kinesthetic gesture are not only the 
fundamental gestalts underlying the cognition of most musical meaning and the 
performance of musical expression, but are also in fact one and the same from 
an ecological perspective. In connecting gesture from the domain of physical 
action on an instrument to its role in music cognition, I reject Jonathan De 
Souza’s delineation, following the work of David McNeill, between the gestures 
of musical interpretation (such as spontaneous hand gestures and swaying of 
the body) and those used to operate a musical instrument (De Souza 2017: 2). 
In an ecological model of performance, gesture is gesture.
The central role of gesture, both physical and metaphorical, in musical 
performance is clear. Listeners perceive musical meaning directly at the level of 
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embodied gesture, performers define their own “action identities” at the level 
of physical gesture, and perception and execution of gesture occupy the same 
cognitive domains through common coding. Consequently, performers and 
their instruments can be said to exist in an ecological relationship exactly at 
the level of embodied gesture. Performers exhibit direct perception of musical 
meaning at the level of gesture, but at the same time play their instruments 
at the level of physical gesture through what one might call “direct action,” 
the common coding mirror to Gibson’s direct perception. The idea of direct 
action is akin to Merleau-Ponty’s description of the organist settling into the 
habitat of the instrument, wherein meticulous, conscious control of every 
minute action gives way to gestalt, well-practiced gestures which “discover 
emotional sources, and … create an expressive space” (Merleau-Ponty 2012 
[1945]: 147). De Souza examines how Martin Heidegger’s concept of zuhanden 
predates Merleau-Ponty’s account and appears to anticipate an ecological view 
of music performance. According to Heidegger, an object “withdraws” from 
one’s awareness and becomes zuhanden following significant experience with 
its manipulation — a process akin to perceptual learning (De Souza 2017: 20). 
What Heidegger misses in the zuhanden process is a cohesive exploration of the 
agency of cultural norms, and of an individual’s history of perception and action. 
While the cultural dimensions of this process are taken up by Merleau-Ponty, 
he neglects to explain the construction of the gestalts of object manipulation.
Ecologies of Practice
Having demonstrated the essential and central role of gesture in the ecology of 
music performance, let us revise the diagram of this model to illustrate where 
gesture fits into perception and action, perceptual learning, and adaptation (Fig. 
2). In the psychohaptic feedback loop of perception and action, the performer 
engages the affordances of the instrument through direct action at the level 
of physical gesture. That is, she does not simply “play the right notes at the 
right time” as Bach is said to have quipped,4 since there are often too many 
notes and nuances going by too rapidly to consciously control every one in a 
linear computational manner (Wolff, Mendel, and David 1998: 412). Rather, 
a performer, through practice and years of guided pedagogy, engages groups of 
notes shaped through complex physical gestures that correspond to the desired 
musical gestures. During this act of performance, the intended and perceived 
musical gestures continually mediate the direct action of physical gesture, and 
vice versa, through aural perception, haptic feedback, and proprioception. The 
performer is able to directly execute the instrument’s affordances for musical 
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Fig 2. The role of gesture in a Gibsonian ecological model of musical performance.
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gesture through countless cycles of perceptual learning, developing cognitive 
and kinesthetic gestural competencies along the way from beginner to expert. 
The principles of perceptual learning grounded in musical and physical gesture 
are illustrated in Repp and Knoblich’s action identity hypothesis, as well as in 
Palmer and Meyer’s research suggesting that the physical gestures and schemas 
of instrumental performance become more abstract as expertise increases 
(Palmer and Meyer 2000). 
While the psychohaptic feedback loop of performance and the process 
of perceptual learning are locked in a reciprocal relationship, this dynamic is 
set up, or assembled, through what Gibson calls adaptation. The ecology of the 
performer and instrument is a symbiotic relationship forged through evolution, 
much as the ecology of an organism in its environment. The coevolution of the 
ecology of the performer and instrument relies on many factors, including the 
evolution of musical instrument design, performance techniques, pedagogical 
schools, and cultural musical aesthetics.
This last segment of the Gibsonian trivium, adaptation, has far reaching 
consequences in the context of the ecology of performance. Factors, or “actors,” 
in this category construct the process of perceptual learning and the perception/
action feedback loops of each performer. It is here where the social meets the 
psychological, where forces outside the performer’s control shape his or her 
individual development, abilities, and musical traits. And again, it is gesture 
that connects these forces with the ecology of the performer in situ. Gestures 
in the form of kinesthetic action and response shape the evolution and design 
of musical instruments themselves. Patterns of gesture and metaphor define 
and shape the evolution of instrumental technique and schools of pedagogy 
and performance. Gestures from other social domains shape the physical 
embodiment of the individual, from socially constructed communicative 
gestures, posture, and walking gaits, to embodiments of gesture in dance, and 
the vocal cadences of language. There is a growing body of research studying 
the broader role of gesture in the construction of social dynamics, and the very 
foundations of human cognition. Michael Corballis (2003) offers a provocative 
exegesis on the gestural origins of human language itself, while Jessica Phillips-
Silver, C. Athena Aktipis, and Gregory Bryant (2010) offer an evolutionary 
account for what appears to be our hardwired propensity for conveying meaning 
through embodied physical and metaphorical gesture. 
The gestures that form the foundation of perception and action cycles and 
the process of perceptual learning in the individual are themselves mappings 
of the gestural discourse of adaptation. Exactly how gestures in other social 
and developmental domains map onto the domains active in performance is 
a question which is only beginning to be addressed. Naveda and Leman have 
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developed sophisticated analytical means with which to measure and analyze 
spontaneous physical gestures in response to music using the mathematics of 
topology (2010). Guerino Mazzola has applied analyses of the geometry of 
gesture to the study of collaborative improvisation (2009), while Friberg has 
built complex computer models to generate simulations and reconstructions 
of the expressive gestural nuances of performance (2006). Additionally, I have 
argued that the dynamic “inertial discourse” of gesture, rather than topology, 
forms the invariants which compel mappings across domains (Harlow 2016).
Regardless of exactly how gestures beget gestures across domains, the 
simultaneous social and psychological gestural construction of perception and 
action and perceptual learning in an individual compels approaches in music 
studies that eschew both a top-down analysis of the performer as arising from the 
social, and a bottom-up picture of the performer as psychologically determined. 
Such approaches would side-step Descola’s “anthropological dualism.” As such, 
I contend that every act of musical performance is a construction of what I call 
an “ecology of practice.” To gain a thick description of any given performance 
situation, or to generalize about a genre of performance synchronically or 
diachronically, one must “follow the actors,” to quote Bruno Latour, that 
brought the performer’s ecology of practice into being. It is not enough to simply 
posit casualty between a cultural or social dynamic and the act of performance, 
nor is it enough to gather empirical data on the act of performance without 
considering the social fabric. As Latour and other scholars of actor-network 
theory (ANT) posit, one must trace the mediators networking these actors and 
agents.5 In the case of music, we must trace them to the point where the social 
meets the physical. That point, I contend, is at the level of musical and physical 
gesture in the context of a performer’s ecological situation of performance, 
or ecology of practice. While each performance situation represents a unique 
ecology of practice, some can be said to be variations of another, or tokens 
of a type, if the actors are stabilized, as in a defined performance genre or 
“performance practice.” 
When examining a performer’s ecology of practice, one must trace how 
mediators shape the gestures underlying the perception and action feedback 
loop of the performer in action, culminating in the ecology of practice at hand. 
Such mediators, actors, and agents may include all the physical, psychological, 
pedagogical, aesthetic, and social — both human and non-human — factors 
underlying adaptation. In tracing and normalizing the diverse actors that are 
constructed through direct action by a performer, we effectively give equal 
weight to the two poles of nature and culture as described by Descola. We eschew 
anthropological dualism by tracing the construction of the ecology of practice 
— that is, by operating a “kind of triage,” to quote Descola’s evocative summary 
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of ANT methodology (Descola 2013: 69). In his analysis of microtiming in 
African-American music, Vijay Iyer utilizes both embodied and situated 
cognition, tracing the actors shaping the practices under discussion through 
each framework (2002). However, in an ecologically grounded ANT analysis of 
musicking — that is, the tracing of a particular ecology of practice — embodied 
and situated cognition form two sides of the same coin. Consequently, the 
concept of ecologies of practice grounded at the level of gesture unites the actors 
and mediators constructing a musical practice in a more universal and inclusive 
manner, flattening the ontologies of the social and physical — a multiplicity in 
the manner of the rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari (1987).
Other scholars have employed the techniques of ANT for musicological 
discourse. Notably, Benjamin Piekut examines American experimental music 
by tracing the actors networking to construct diverse practices, arguing that 
experimentalism is best understood not as a movement but rather as the result 
of convergent aesthetic, political, and physical forces (2011). Piekut discusses 
Charlotte Moorman’s performance of John Cage’s 26’1.1499, of which the 
composer was highly critical. Rather than fail within Cage’s experimental 
aesthetic, a view which would necessarily posit a definition of Cagean 
experimentalism antithetical to the assemblage of experimentalism in practice, 
Piekut argues that Moorman uses the work to “reapproach her corporeal 
relationship” with the cello (2011: 149). In doing so, she redefines her 
subjectivity of self in a Foucaultian sense of experimentalism. In the language 
of the framework proposed in this paper, Cage’s work becomes a disruptive 
agent within Moorman’s ecological relationship with her instrument. The act 
of grappling with the work forms an essential part of the cultural and physical 
construction of Moorman’s ecology of practice. Moving beyond music, Carrie 
Noland offers a theoretical account of the role of gesture as a means for 
individual agency in constructing the cultural collective (2009). This process 
is analogous to Piekut’s example of the construction of Moorman’s gestures, 
mediated by Cage’s score, as part of the networking of experimental music 
practices.
Other examples of ANT can be found across ethnomusicology, including 
Harris Berger’s ethnography of heavy metal, rock, and jazz in Cleveland (1999). 
Relying on extensive interviews with practicing musicians, Berger offers a 
phenomenological perspective of practice. Matthew Rahaim traces nuances 
of Indian vocal practice through the pedagogical lineage of performative hand 
gestures, connecting the kinesthetics of performance with the construction 
of cultural practices (2012). Connecting the cultural and kinesthetic in the 
opposite direction, Deborah Wong traces the cultural agencies constructing 
bodily practice in Asian-American musicians (2004). Such approaches eschew 
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the Cartesian dualism discussed earlier, though they do not offer the same 
degree of ontological flattening as the ecologically-mediated model of ecologies 
of practice, a model that provides a framework with which to potentially trace 
the construction of practice from the level of the neuron through the cultural 
and political.
From a philosophical standpoint, my concept of ecologies of practice 
has kinship with Isabelle Stengers’ term “ecology of practices.” Stengers’ 
concept concerns the ontology of patterns of thought; in her sense, an ecology 
of practice is a “tool for thinking” (2005: 185). It refers to the networking of 
actors that construct human epistemologies, politics, and ethics.6 Similarly, my 
concept of ecologies of practice concerns the construction of individuals’ states 
of being, but in the domain of kinesthetic action (or the cognitive mapping 
thereof, in the case of composers and listeners). In this respect, my concept also 
holds similarities to David Kirsh’s concept of “enactive landscapes,” illustrating 
how the design of tools and the affordances they present compel specific modes 
of usage and shapes the development of new practices of kinesthetic action 
(Kirsh 2013). However, Kirsh does not offer an explanation for exactly how 
tools compel modes of usage, or, as in the case of Heidegger’s zuhanden, how 
the cultural dimension fits into the construction of such modes. The concept 
of ecologies of practice and the ecological model of performance presented 
here account for the reciprocal ways in which individuals manipulate objects 
(musical instruments) and how the design of these objects and the mediators 
of culture shape their usage, namely at the level of gesture. Rather than an 
inactive landscape, an ecology of practice in my sense can be thought of as an 
“enactive gesturescape.” Alternatively, whereas Stengers’ ecology of practices 
may be said to be an enactive landscape of the ethical/political and of the 
construction of value, my concept of an ecology of practice can be said to be 
an enactive landscape of gesture in the construction of a musical hermeneutic. 
An ecology of practice is not a defined, stable entity, nor is it a field 
for agency. Rather, it is process; it is a means of coming into being. It is an 
act of musicking. As opposed to a musical performance, which is an event in 
time and space, an ecology of practice is a fragile, temporal “thing” in Latour’s 
sense (2004: 233). It is forever being assembled and can only be examined as 
long as the mediators can continue to be traced. Two performers might play 
the same piece of music in two entirely different ways, constructing two very 
different ecologies of practice. The fundamental gestural identities of these 
two ecologies may be the result of differences in the materials and designs of 
their instruments, or the metaphors and schemas of the pedagogical schools 
in which they were trained, or their respective cultural traditions of dance and 
social kinesthetic action, or all these and more, at the same time.
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I will conclude by briefly exploring two examples of musical performance 
to further illustrate how ecologies of practice are constructed, and how this 
concept can help illuminate crucial mediators connecting the social and 
physical which might otherwise be overlooked, connections which may lead 
to unexpected new insights. From the time of Heinrich Scheidemann in the 
early 17th century through Johann Sebastian Bach, the improvised organ 
chorale fantasy remained an essential and pinnacle skill for keyboard players 
and composers in central and northern Germany (Belotti 1995). Consisting of 
the contrapuntal and highly varied elaboration of each line of a hymn melody, 
a masterful chorale fantasy would offer a hermeneutic exposition of the sacred 
text through the practice of musical rhetoric (Dirksen 1999). Furthermore, the 
chorale fantasy compelled the organist, more than in any other genre, to utilize 
to the widest expressive capacity the vast tonal, textural, and haptic affordances 
unique to the particular organ at hand. The combined affordances of the specific 
organ’s physical action, corpus of finger-scaled musical rhetorical figures, and 
culturally-bound application of these figures for hermeneutic expression — all 
examples of affordances co-evolved through adaptation and made available 
through perceptual learning for direct action by the performer — define the 
organ chorale fantasy’s “ecology of practice” in an individual. It is an ecology 
within which the improvising performer, through the reciprocity of perception 
and action and perceptual learning assembled by adaptation, is equipped to 
direct consciousness through the creative act. In other words, when the organist 
sits at the organ console, he or she is immersed in an ecological situation, as in 
Merleau-Ponty’s example, that can only be mediated through direct perception 
and action, not through a linear computational/analytical model of mind and 
performance. 
Through years of perceptual learning — including haptic/embodied 
experience on a variety of individual organs, a pedagogy of embodied metaphor 
and contrapuntal practice shaping the use of musical figuren, and knowledge of 
the Lutheran Catechism and chorale texts — the organist is able to improvise 
with musical gestures, select deliberate and symbolic stop combinations, and 
shape sound through architectural space across the numerous keyboards and 
pedal boards through direct action, saving the conscious level of attention 
for shaping the larger rhetorical and music structure. The ecological situation 
of the chorale fantasy links together the cultural and physical actors which 
shape the genre. At the same time, by examining adaptation in the ecology of 
practice, further questions arise as to how these actors and agents are themselves 
formed and mediated. For example, what does the shape of musical figuren 
owe to the design and weight of the organ action in North Germany — that 
is, the mechanical connections between the keys and pipe valves? And what 
231 Harlow: Ecologies of Practice in Musical Performance
does the tradition of action construction among the organ building guilds in 
that time and place owe to the economic and raw material realities of the day? 
Furthermore, how does the mean-tone temperament of the organ shape the 
contrapuntal sequences and “patterns of invention” of these musical figures 
(Dreyfus 2004), and how do these tonally constrained contrapuntal affordances 
shape the larger structures and rhetorical-theological discourse of the chorale 
text? 
The Baroque organ chorale fantasy provides a very rarefied and clear view 
of a solo performer in action, constructing a mediated network of actors and 
agents through an ecology of practice. But what of collaborative performance? 
Consider a string quartet, jazz combo, or free-improvisation ensemble. Each 
performer occupies his or her own ecology of practice with his or her own 
instrument. These practices, similar to those of the Baroque organist, have been 
shaped through Gibsonian perceptual learning by the embodied metaphors of 
schools of pedagogy, musical aesthetics, and the haptic properties and affordances 
of the instrument. But how are these individual ecologies of practice shaped 
by and further shaping the ensemble dynamic and aesthetic identity? Again, 
it is because of perceptual learning through cycles of perception and action 
— cycles which take place aurally and verbally during rehearsal, individual 
practice, email, and even casual social interaction. Over time, the members 
resonate in an ecological manner of direct action and perception, shaped by the 
invariant underlying image schemas and embodied metaphors structuring the 
gestures of these interactions. The subtle nuances in timing, the synchronous 
aesthetic shifts and real-time decisions, the ineffable qualities of the ensemble, 
are all the result of resonating and ever-shifting ecologies of practice among the 
individual performers as assembled through the mediators of gesture. We must 
follow the actors and trace the mediators shaping the ecologies of practice of 
the performers — that is, shaping direct action in the physical gestures of each 
performer.
A particularly instructive example of the convergence of the cultural and 
cognitive in the construction of a performance practice can be found in Iyer’s 
analysis of rhythmic fluctuation in jazz and popular music (2002). Taking as 
a starting point Samuel Floyd’s 1995 study of the ring shout ritual among the 
African diaspora as the foundation for much of the stylistic practices of African-
American art forms, Iyer traces physiological connections between the stomp 
and clap gestures of the ring shout and the subtle shaping of backbeat pulse and 
swing (Iyer 2002: 406-411). In connecting the tendency in African-American 
musical practices to play behind the beat with gestural practices found across 
the African diaspora (a common hermeneutic of such practices, and universal, 
human physiology constraints), Iyer is following the actors constructing these 
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diverse ecologies of practice. The resolution of the picture resulting from such 
an ANT approach is proportional to the number of actors and mediators being 
traced. Questions remain: how and where did individual performers absorb such 
practices? How do the physical affordances of the instruments at hand shape 
the temporal dimension of such gestures? What inertial dynamics are common 
between the associated gestures of the ring shout, African-American musical 
gestures, and the physical gestures of performance? Piekut (2011) and De Souza 
(2017) address the former two questions within their respective inquiries, while 
I address the latter in my inertial theory of gesture (Harlow 2016).
Furthermore, Iyer states that he offers examples from African-American 
musical practices because they particularly value “deliberately asynchronous 
unisons, subtle separation of rapid consecutive notes, asymmetrical subdivision 
of a pulse, and microscopic delays,” elements he claims are distinct from 
those commonly studied in the practices of Western classical art music (Iyer 
2002: 411). However, all these elements can be found in the Western classical 
tradition. To name but one example, the practice of notes inégales in the French 
classical tradition offers a rough analogue to Iyer’s examples of swing in jazz, 
albeit the specific realization and actors behind the construction of each are 
entirely different. ANT approaches to the study of notes inégales include the 
comparison of prose found within treatises (Douglas 1995) and the irregular 
pinning of mechanical organs from the period (Moelants 2011: 449). Of 
course, Iyer does not deny that these elements can be found elsewhere and 
claims that such techniques “are found to varying degrees in all world music” 
(Iyer 2002: 411; emphasis in original). Similarly, the crux of this paper is the 
claim, illustrated in the diverse examples above, that physical and cultural actors 
and mediators converge at the level of gesture to ecologically construct the act 
of musicking among individuals across all cultures. 
One key issue that remains to be addressed is the role of consciousness 
in the construction and realization of ecologies of practice. This is of course 
a complex topic that intersects many fields of inquiry, and as such is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, I suggest that Iyer offers a key insight in this 
regard. On the topic of conscious choices presented to an improvising musician, 
he proposes that such conscious action decisions “may be understood partially 
as a dialectic between formal/symbolic and situational/embodied constraints” 
(Iyer 2002: 409). Not only does this apply to all types of performance, 
improvisational or otherwise, but I also propose that Iyer’s idea of a dialectic 
suggests that the consciousness of performance is not an agent or mediator in 
and of itself but is rather an emergent property of the interaction of cultural 
and physical agencies. For a phenomenological account of such of dialectic, see 
Sudnow (1978).
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In summary, the act of musical performance is an inherently ecological 
situation. Performers engage with their instruments and music through cycles of 
perception and action, shaping and shaped by perceptual learning. This process 
is assembled through the mediators and actors of adaptation and is coordinated 
at the level of embodied gesture. In this manner, every act of performance 
amounts to the construction of an ecology of practice. Considering the act of 
musicking as an ecological situation is not only empirically demonstrable, but 
the concept of ecologies of practice also unites musical performance ontologies 
across disciplines and cultures, from historical- and ethnomusicology to 
cognitive- and neuropsychology, operating as a triage between the poles of 
music musicking and music musicked, to borrow from Spinoza, compelling us to 
reconsider the construction of every act of musicking. 
Notes
1. Throughout this paper, I will borrow Small’s term, “musicking,” in reference 
to music as process and as action — as something which is performed, composed, or 
perceived, rather than an object which is (Small 1998).
2. The term “performance studies” throughout this paper refers to the Anglo-
European field that emerged from the confluence of empirical musicology, structural 
theory, and psychology, rather than the North American field of the same name that 
emerged from theatre, dance, sociology, and anthropology.
3. My use of the terms “ecology” and “ecological” are distinct from their general 
use in the field of ecomusicology (Allen and Dawe 2016) and in the scientific disci-
pline of ecology. My work is an extension of ecological psychology, focusing on the 
influences shaping the specific actions of a situated individual.
4. From a quote anecdotally attributed to Bach, dating later than 1776 by Johann 
Friedrich Köhler (Wolff, Mendel, and David 1998: 412).
5. For a thorough overview of the techniques, origins, and epistemology of actor-
network theory, see Latour (2005).
6. For a thorough presentation of Stengers’ concept of “Ecology of Practices” see 
Stengers (2010).
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